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ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECTURE AND THE CITY: SOME THEMES ON THE 
CONTINUITY OF CLASSICAL IDEAS RELATING TO THE LATIN MIDDLE 
AGES 
Christian Frost 
Introduction 
In his 2004 book Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of 
Creativity in the Age of Production, Dalibor Vesely argues that the study of optics—and the 
associated philosophies of light that emerged during the ‘twelfth-century renaissance’ in 
theology and philosophy1—generated the primary conditions for the European ‘Renaissance’ 
in classical culture.2 However, the emergence of these new ideas, he argues, also laid the 
foundations for the more explicit form of ‘divided representation’ that makes understanding 
this transition now, within our own culture, extremely challenging. His argument is not that 
the classical and modern worlds were completely distinct, but that over time, the focus 
shifted in such a way that understanding the transition brought about by this early study of 
optics is now hampered by a post-Enlightenment focus on form, rationality and the scientific 
method.3 Therefore, any suggestion that the re-emergence of classical architecture—and the 
classical ideal of the city—was primarily a revival of certain ‘forms’ is misguided and built 
on a misunderstanding of the ontological foundation of the western European tradition.  
It is important to state that Vesely’s critique does not undermine all contemporary 
investigations conducted within this ‘modern’ system. Many contemporary accounts of the 
past from different disciplines (using different methodologies) have successfully traced 
themes defined within particular parameters and, as a result, presented useful insights. 
Nevertheless, such histories in relation to architecture are problematic. The difference lies in 
the fact that, because it is a participatory art, architecture is a part of a broader continuity, 
both in relation to the culture of the time in which it was created and in relation to the 
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duration of its own existence. Within the period in question, for example, architecture must 
be understood in relation to the ‘communicative’ or ‘poetic’ aspects of representation that 
were an essential part of the culture of antiquity and the Middle Ages. Without this, the 
architecture can only be understood as form, and meaning derived from a set of signs. In 
reality, festivals, rituals, agonistic rites and everyday experiences—as well as the material of 
the architecture itself—all contribute to the communicative aspect of the art, whether they are 
recognised by the analysis or not. 
The distance separating the instrumental and the communicative understanding of 
architecture represents a wide gap in our contemporary culture… What we 
normally refer to as reality, believing it is something fixed and absolute, is always 
the result of our ability to experience, visualize, and articulate—in other words, to 
represent so as to participate in the world.4 
Using Vesely’s idea that representation, particularly in relation to architecture, is best 
understood as a participatory act, this chapter aims to re-contextualise the continuity of 
‘communicative’ or ‘poetic’ thought in relation to architectural discourse from antiquity to 
the renaissance of classical culture in the quattrocento, by tracing themes that were also 
evident in the mediaeval world. It will suggest that despite the relationship of Vitruvius to 
Leon Battista Alberti, who with “…Nicholas of Cusa and the formation of Renaissance 
perspective [presents] the first plausible anticipation of modernity,”5 this transition was 
underpinned by themes already articulated in the mediaeval world.  
The Legacy of Vitruvius’s De Architectura  
The spread of the classical tradition of architecture in the West was promulgated by 
the re-presentation of Vitruvius’s De Architectura6 in key treatises of the early fifteenth 
century.7 Additionally, these texts—notably by Alberti (1404-72), Serlio (1475-1554) and 
Palladio (1508-80)—were also influential in developing the role of the architect and the 
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discipline of architecture into forms that are still familiar to us now. However, although these 
treatises updated many of the themes and ideas presented in De Architectura, in order to 
make them relevant for their contemporary audiences, in the process they also perpetuated 
some prejudices that contributed to the division of culture discussed in the introduction. For 
example, it would appear that Vitruvius’s description of the ‘knowledge’ necessary to be an 
architect is relatively comprehensive: 
The architect should be equipped with knowledge (scientia) of many branches of 
study (disciplinis) and varied kinds of learning, for it is by his judgement that all 
work done by the other arts is put to the test. His endeavour is the child of 
practice (fabrica) and theory (ratiocination).8 
His account of the city, however, and the actions of the ‘architect’ in relation to the 
city, are presented in a very technical (one could argue instrumental) manner. At no point 
does he address the symbolic aspects of architecture and the city that were clearly significant 
at the time.9 Even Vitruvius’ description of the skills the architect should possess in order to 
practise are presented in rather a mundane fashion, concentrating on a list of activities rather 
than the way they should be utilised (ethically, for example): 
He should be a man of letters, skilful with a pencil, instructed in geometry, know 
much history, have listened diligently to the philosophers, be acquainted with 
music, not ignorant of medicine, learned in the responses of the jurists, and be 
acquainted with the rational order of astronomy and the heavens.10 
Equally, when he describes ‘of what things architecture consists,’ he does so without 
relating these ‘things’ to any symbolic ideas.11 Even though he does not state categorically 
that symbolic ordering of the city is irrelevant or of lesser status than knowledge leading to 
its technical realisation, nevertheless, his selective coverage of the topic results in the 
possibility that architecture and the city could be seen as divided between technical and 
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symbolic acts. Was this his intention? Did he actively seek this division? To address these 
questions, his use of terminology needs to be investigated further. 
 Aside from the obvious significance in the broad scope of skills required by the 
architect (with the implication that the final building will, in some way, reflect these skills), 
Vitruvius uses various terms to describe different forms of knowledge.12 For example, in 
book one, chapter one, he uses scientia13 to describe knowledge in relation to the practical 
arts—or at least a selection of arts that include a practical art where dexterity and skill also 
form part of the knowledge, such as in drawing or music.14 Scientia may not be the exact skill 
itself—i.e., the architect may not be a mason or carpenter, sculptor or musician, or even a 
doctor or astronomer—but he must have knowledge of all of these ‘practical’ fields in order 
to build buildings, towns and cities suitable for late republican or early imperial Roman 
society.  
Similarly, Vitruvius’s use of the term rationes for ‘practical knowledge’ means that 
although he is apparently advocating something similar to Aristotle’s phronesis,15 again, for 
Vitruvius, actual engagement in an activity does not appear to be necessary. The result of 
such a differentiation—even though that may not have been his intention—is that ‘types’ of 
knowledge form into a hierarchy, with (in this case) praxis below knowledge of praxis.  
It is clear that Vitruvius is making a distinction between forms of knowledge because 
elsewhere in the text he goes as far as to say that practitioners who rely on theories and 
scholarship alone (ratiocinationibus et litteris) without having ‘practical knowledge’ are only 
“follow[ing] the shadow and not reality.”16 Therefore, in order to begin to explore these 
differences, i.e., the interconnectedness but distinction between these forms of knowledge, 
Vitruvius’ use of the term geometria in chapter one will be examined.17  
For Vitruvius, geometria (translated as ‘geometry’) is a form of science (doctrinus) 
associated with the Greek logos opticos comprising two distinct components: firstly, the skill 
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to reveal internal relationships of lines, curves and angles (more akin to the contemporary use 
of the term geometry); and secondly as a reference to the ‘harmony’ of the stars and musical 
‘concords’ such as fourths and fifths, thus reflecting the ‘laws/discourse’ of music and vision 
in the perception of nature that comes from the Pythagorean tradition.18 Even though this 
double meaning is not often explicitly stated, for Vitruvius it is always present.19 Elsewhere 
in his treatise, although similar dialectical structures of meaning are implied in other 
activities—such as in his discourse on the “actual undertaking…by hand”— he clearly 
indicates that for him the practical skills, of which the architect must also have “a fairly good 
knowledge,” are more significant. Certainly, if Vitruvius’s priorities in ascertaining 
architectural values were measured by the number of words used, then one would be left in 
no doubt that it was the practicalities of construction he was interested in. The question is, 
how does this knowledge associated with the technical production of something link to the 
ideas that guarantee its meaning? 
Apart from the early parts of book one, he has very little to say on the possible 
symbolic relationships inherent to the classical tradition which he is describing. Even in book 
three, where he talks of the proportions of the human body (proportio in Latin, analogia in 
Greek)20 moving towards an application in the proportion of temples using the ‘perfect 
number’ (perfectum numerum in Latin, teleon in Greek),21 he does so in rather mundane 
terms. It appears that, like many architects and architectural historians since, he has assumed 
that if a connection exists between geometry and cosmology, or mathematics or proportion or 
nature, implications of such connections can be applied to something post facto once the 
geometrical, environmental and constructional practicalities have been implemented. 
Therefore, even though he implies a permanent and significant connection between geometry 
and geometria, he also indicates that a practical application of geometry is enough and the 
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rest will follow, thus disconnecting any ‘embodied’ ontological understanding of meaning 
from the thing itself.  
However, it would be a mistake to assume that because Vitruvius does not stress this 
aspect of meaning in architecture, he does not value it at all, or that protagonists of the early 
humanist tradition of quattrocento Italy who borrowed his ideas were also ignorant of this 
link. The ability to separate the ‘communicative’ and the ‘instrumental’ was certainly a 
possibility in these texts, but for all these men, they were still clearly linked. Vitruvius’ 
variation of terms for ‘knowledge’ suggests that he could be very precise in referring to the 
deeper structures of scientia et geometria, and indicates he did have a concern for ‘meaning,’ 
even if he valued it less than building practicalities. 
On balance, even though it can be said Vitruvius’s text has ambiguities that have 
sanctioned its use to support limited evaluations of architectural form in the periods that 
followed, it also appears that the text can sustain a more embodied interpretation with greater 
links to Greek thought. In order to assess the possible extent of this, some themes relating to 
form, knowledge and order in the Greek world need to be evaluated. 
Dialectical Order in the Idea of the City in Classical Greece 
In the Greek tradition, the difference between instrumental and communicative 
representation can be explained in the distinction they made between ‘form’ (what is 
apprehended through the senses that only ‘resembles the true’) and ‘nature’ (a greater 
reality). In the Republic, Plato uses the term episteme (translated into Latin as scientia by 
Roman and mediaeval scholars) specifically in relation to the correct rule of a city within a 
dialogue that also mused upon the nature of reality as a whole. In book seven (514a-520a), 
the allegory of the cave, he describes reality as moving shadows of things, men and animals 
(some who talk) cast on the wall of a cave in front of humanity by light from a fire behind. 
Thus, for Plato, any opinions based on analysis of the ‘shadows’ (doxa or form) without 
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reference to the broader setting (nature) must be considered extremely limited in scope. In the 
context of the tension in Vitruvius’s work discussed above, even though many writers have 
interpreted his understanding of architecture through form, there is still the possibility to see 
in De Architectura the dialectic of perception and meaning (in nature) alluded to here by 
Plato. As a consequence, it is possible to view Vitruvius’s description of existing 
relationships ontologically, even if his analysis of the causation is more instrumental.  
Earlier in the Republic, there are other insights useful to this analysis. In book five, Plato 
introduces several pairs of terms—justice and injustice, philosophy and philodoxy, truth and 
falsehood—as a way of describing the difference between a good and a corrupt society, 
suggesting that it is only out of the constant struggle between these pairs that order can be 
maintained and wisdom secured. Eric Voegelin, in evaluating this process, is thus led to the 
conclusion that for Plato, “… philosophy is not the doctrine of right order, but the light of 
wisdom that falls on the struggle,”22 and that the use of dialectical terms is an important part 
of the way Plato articulated the right order of the city itself: 
[Plato’s] philosopher does not exist in a social vacuum, but in opposition to the 
sophist. Justice is not defined in the abstract but in opposition to the concrete 
forms which injustice assumes. The right order of the polis is not presented as an 
“ideal state,” but the elements of right order are developed in concrete opposition 
to the elements of disorder surrounding society.23 
Therefore, the “right order of the polis” was seen to emerge from contemplation of 
these pairs (good and bad), and this dialectic resulted in wisdom situated within the city 
where such tensions were articulated. For Plato, the sophist was the person who wanted to 
undermine this dialectic of justice by leading the discourse away from content towards 
‘form,’ i.e., the person whose aim was to win an argument regardless of the ethical or moral 
consequences. For the sophist, the art of argument was seen to be more important than 
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content. Again, it is critical to recognise that in this process there is a connection between 
‘form’ and ‘meaning’ but that form is not the limit of meaning; it points to it but it is not, in 
and of itself, meaningful, even though it plays a critical part in the processes of 
communication, interpretation and understanding. 
In terms of understanding the problems relating to architecture and the city, it is the 
second pair of Plato’s terms, philosophy and philodoxy, that are the most significant. In the 
dialogue, Socrates describes true philosophers as 
Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamoured (475e); … 
[those] who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by 
itself (476b)… [not] mistaking resemblance for identity…the man whose thought 
recognises a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the 
things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the 
participants…(476c-d). 
At a mundane level, although most modern empirical categorisations of elements, 
things or behaviours etc. are predicated on the fact that they do not mistake ‘resemblance’ for 
‘identity,’ in reality, it is more that they do not perceive any difference. For example, 
architects evaluating cities on the basis of typology argue that their conclusions are defined 
through empirical observation and analysis of real things. However, they are, like Vitruvius, 
suggesting that geometria automatically follows geometry—for them, meaning is 
independent of form but can be assigned to form after the fact. For Plato, such an evaluation 
shifts more towards the world of doxophilists, who 
…view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to 
follow another’s guidance to it, and many just things, but not to justice itself, and 
	 9	
so on in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but 
know nothing of the things they opine (479e). 
Thus, it should be recognised that Plato’s definition of philosophy goes beyond the 
rudimentary sequencing of ‘physical’ characteristics of things and builds from an ontological 
core. Voegelin articulates this aspect of Plato’s thinking thus: 
Only the knowledge of being “in itself” can truly lay claim to the title of 
knowledge (episteme); the knowledge of being in the manifold of things is 
opinion (doxa).24 
In the world of architecture and the city, even a perfect empirical categorisation of an 
object is still limited by the situation within which it can be analysed. No matter how 
sophisticated the analysis, its ontological nature remains elusive unless aspects of its being 
form a part of the investigation. In the classical world, in the mediaeval world, and in the re-
emerging classicism of quattrocento Europe, this was understood and, even if not explicitly 
stated, was utilised in both the making of architecture and the city, and in explaining and 
interpreting the past as tradition.  
Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the idea that the re-
emergence of classical architecture and the city was purely a revival of certain ‘forms’ is 
based on a misunderstanding of the ontological foundation of the western European tradition. 
It should also be acknowledged that this misinterpretation of the classical world has led to the 
gradual erosion of the idea that the ‘good’ city, like Plato’s dialectical wisdom, emerges from 
an agonistic struggle rather than from any one particular ideal (or utopia).25 Wisdom and the 
good city, for Plato as well as for many thinkers of the Middle Ages, could only emerge from 
continual negotiation between terms or hierarchies, not from absolutes.  
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In the terminology used by Vitruvius, this manifests itself in the dilemma that in 
describing geometria, Vitruvius also facilitates the existence of a narrower analysis of the 
condition of geometry. Vitruvius may not agree with this limited description of geometry but, 
nevertheless, he facilitates its propagation. As a consequence, aspects of being that lie outside 
a broader understanding of reason begin to be questioned or, as in the case of Plato’s term 
philodoxy, forgotten altogether.  
Creation and the Liberal Arts in Thirteenth-century Europe 
In the theology of the Middle Ages, the dialectics articulated by Plato were adapted to 
address Christian ideas such as the nature of God, the Creation and the manipulation of 
matter and, in the process, contributed to the transformation of the overall order into a 
hierarchy. By the thirteenth century, the neo-Platonic writings of the church fathers, 
reinforced by the re-emergence and translation of Aristotelian and Platonic texts, had created 
an intellectual horizon where developments in knowledge (scientia) gathered pace, but also 
needed to be reconciled with the doctrines of the church. Studies on light and optics in 
relation to geometry and perspective played a significant part in this transition. 
The importance given to the phenomenon of light in medieval cosmologies 
reflects a tendency to grasp the mystery of creation in a more tangible way and 
move beyond the poetic and rhetorical language of Neo-Platonism towards a 
more precise syllogistic reasoning, leading eventually to a geometrical 
understanding of light. In this process light ceased to be a mere metaphor or 
analogy of intelligibility and became a real natural power—understood as a part 
of the creative act itself.26 
Here, Vesely argues that the dialectical tension discussed in relation to Plato was still evident 
in the creative cultures of the Middle Ages, but that the ideas had been tempered by the need 
to include creation and the incarnation within the original order.  
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One of the main mechanisms that facilitated this transition was the education system 
based upon the seven ‘liberal arts.’ This system had originally been conceived in Greece in 
the fourth century BC to offer a basic education that prepared students for future discourse in 
philosophy, but was later developed by the Romans who placed the arts of ideas—the 
trivium27—above the arts related to things—quadrivium.28 However, when this sevenfold 
structure was later adopted by the Christian culture of the Middle Ages, it was transformed 
again. All Christians (even schismatics) believed that God created the world from nothing, 
but, at the Council of Nicea, orthodox belief identified Christ as a part of the Trinity, each 
part of which shared the same essence (ousia); thus, Christ as man was both body and spirit, 
and His sacrifice redeemed both the body and spirit of man. Hence, the world of created 
matter, which itself was seen as an analogue of God, was re-sacralised.29 Whereas the 
Romans and Greeks had bypassed this problem of the origins of matter by assigning the role 
of the gods as ‘shapers’ rather than ‘creators’ of matter (hence the primacy of ideas over 
things in the liberal arts),30 Christians were required to believe that all creation was God’s 
work and thus, worthy of study. This adaption of the original terms altered the original 
hierarchy of the liberal arts, putting the quadrivium—dealing with aspects of nature 
(creation)—at least on the same level as the trivium—dealing with ideas.31 
Some early Christian writers such as John Scotus Eriugena (c. 815-c. 877) believed 
that all scripture (through which the Christian’s relationship to creation was revealed) was 
based on the skills of the liberal arts, thus suggesting more of a Roman hierarchy of arts with 
words above things.32 However, having made this distinction, he then struggled to describe 
the nature of reality itself, suggesting that God had only brought his creative power into the 
‘corruptible’ world of matter following the Fall, and that as a consequence, God had 
projected sin onto a cosmos of matter separate from spirit.33 Christ’s incarnation and sacrifice 
had saved the world of matter, but it was still corruptible because it was not a part of God’s 
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chosen domain. This interpretation of pseudo-Dionysius meant that, for Eriugena, the internal 
division of the liberal arts was correct but also that any other activities, such as the 
‘mechanical arts’34 which were made with manual labour, were of lesser import and 
implicitly ‘tainted’ by sin.  
However, with the rise in scholarship and Platonism in the twelfth century, this idea 
shifted. 
As against the projection of sin onto the cosmos, the masters of the twelfth 
century, resting their case on the interpretation given the Timaeus and the pseudo-
Dionysian hierarchy at Chartres, proclaimed that the possibility of participating in 
the divine reality belonged expressly to matter as well as to everything above it; 
that the immense unity of all things was knotted up together in man who stands at 
the paradoxical borderline of matter and spirit.35 
This new interpretation facilitated a reappraisal of the whole hierarchy, including the possible 
recalibration of the ‘arts’ (embracing architecture) because, although the liberal arts were still 
the only ‘noble’ subjects, working with materials and things was also acceptable because it 
engaged with God’s creation. It is no coincidence that this discourse on the separation of 
matter and spirit (idea) has echoes of the geometry/geometria issues raised in the discussion 
of Vitruvius’s De Architectura, and can be traced into other aspects of education and the arts 
in the early mediaeval period.  
The most significant text that set out a framework for the hierarchies of the artes for 
the Middle Ages was De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (The Marriage of Philology and 
Mercury), written between 410 and 439AD by Martianus Capella (active in the early part of 
the fifth century AD).36 The work was known at this time through the proliferation of a 
significant commentary by Eriugena, and because it was discussed by Hugh of St Victor 
(1096-1141) in his Didascalicon in the late 1120s.37  
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In Martianus’ original work, Apollo proposes that Mercury (representing profitable 
pursuit) weds Philologia (learning), daughter of Phronesis (akin to practical wisdom or, in 
many Christian translations, prudentia or Prudence), who, “…being well versed in the law of 
Parnassus [the home of poetry, literature, and learning] but also in the secrets of the starry 
heavens and the underworld, embraces all knowledge.”38 On her arrival at Jupiter’s palace, 
she is greeted by the four cardinal virtues (Prudence – prudentia, Justice – iustitia, 
Temperance – temperantia and Courage - fortitudo)39 and the three Graces, or theological 
virtues (Faith - fides, Hope - spes and Charity/Love - caritas),40 together comprising the 
seven Christian virtues. Following an initiation, she is taken up to the Roman Mount 
Olympus (which, unlike the Greek Olympus, includes mortals as well as gods) and given the 
seven liberal arts as gifts. 
…Grammar appears as a grey-haired woman of advanced age, who boasts that she 
descends from the Egyptian king Osiris […] she appears in Roman dress. She 
carries an ebony casket, containing a knife and a file with which to operate 
surgically on children’s grammatical errors. Rhetoric is a magnificently tall and 
beautiful woman, wearing a dress decorated with all the figures of speech and 
carrying weapons with which she wounds her adversaries…41 
 
Insert Figure 1 here: West Front of Chartres Cathedral 
This iconography, taken from the text, can also be seen on the tympanum of the door 
of the Virgin on the west front of Chartres Cathedral,42 built 1145-55. in a programme where 
the Virgin Mary takes over the role of Philology (or perhaps phronesis) as the “human soul in 
all perfection” surrounded by, among other elements, the seven liberal arts, alongside 
sculptures in support of the new twelfth-century hierarchy mentioned above, where God is 
depicted as the creator of the cosmos (figure 1).43  
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By the time of the construction of this west façade of Chartres in the mid-twelfth 
century, Hugh of St Victor, in his Didascalicon, had already described the mechanical arts as 
part of a hierarchy with philosophy at the top,44 but added that the hierarchy is also temporal. 
This meant that, for Hugh, true philosophy is “divine wisdom” (a “living mind”) which “… 
in a single and simultaneous vision beholds (intuetur) all things past, present, and future,” 
and that its aim is to “restore within us the divine likeness which to us is a form (forma) but 
to God is his nature.” With this analysis, which touches on the subjects of the quadrivium, 
time is considered a part of the same spectrum, as inseparable from experience as matter. The 
creation of matter had a beginning, and it will have an end; therefore, all creation (including 
the works of man) within the world mirrors the creative act itself temporally, physically and 
ontologically.  
He also makes a distinction between different arts and disciplines and the knowledge 
(scientia) associated with them, saying something can be called an art “when it comprises the 
rules and precepts of an art” or “when it treats of matters that only resemble the true and are 
objects of opinion,” but can be called a discipline “when it is said to be ‘full’ as it is in the 
‘instructional’ science” or “when, by means of true arguments, it deals with matters unable to 
be other than they are.” Therefore, according to Hugh, architecture is an art (its form only 
resembles the true) and logic, a discipline.45  
Over the next few chapters, Hugh lays out the differences between theoretical 
knowledge, practical knowledge, mechanical knowledge and logical knowledge, setting out 
the seven mechanical arts in book two, chapter twenty. Architecture, although not explicitly 
mentioned here, is later defined as part of armaments (constructional armaments such as wall 
building, chapter twenty-two) and is indirectly referred to as a part of the construction of 
spaces for amusement and leisure (theatres, gymnasia, temples etc., chapter twenty-seven).  
Thus, Hugh implies that the skills required to be an architect are the same as those mentioned 
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by Vitruvius in De Architectura; the architect must have knowledge of the quadrivium as 
well as these more ‘practical’ skills, because architecture embodies all of the arts—it is 
neither purely practical nor purely theoretical. By making architecture a subset of 
‘armaments,’ taking ritual out of ‘theatrics,’46 and ignoring the capacity for ontological 
mediation present in both arts, Hugh could easily be accused, like Vitruvius, of a certain 
degree of instrumental thinking. However, the fact that for Hugh, all the arts ascend towards 
the interpretation of scripture as the highest goal, bound the activity into the hierarchy of 
biblical exegesis which was itself already stratified into four levels: literally as a history; 
allegorically, allowing links to be made between the Old and New Testament themes; 
tropologically, as a guide for how to act in the present; and anagogically in relation to the 
future. Such a system had earlier allowed John Cassian (360-435) different ways to 
understand and interpret the mundane world: 
Jerusalem can be taken in four senses: historically [literally], as the city of the 
Jews, allegorically as the Church of Christ [in the sense of the institution rather 
than the building], anagogically as the Heavenly City of God ‘which is mother of 
us all’, (Gal.4:26) tropologically, as the soul of man, which is frequently subject 
to praise or blame from the Lord often under this title.47 
This way of thinking was clearly still germane in the twelfth century because it appears again 
in Hugh of St Victor’s De arca Noe Morali, where he describes four different ways of talking 
about the ark.48 
Conclusion 
The hierarchies used by the theologians of the Middle Ages to advise their artificers 
were part of the contemplative horizon of all activities. In the same way that Vitruvius stated 
various forms of ‘knowledge’ were essential for the work of architects, and thus implied they 
should at least play some part in the evaluation of the final building, so Hugh suggests a 
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similar ground for Christian creativity. He recognises a difference between ‘speculative 
knowledge’ (intelligentiam) that comes from a divine action, and ‘practical knowledge’ 
(scientia) deriving ‘practical council’ from below, but for him they necessarily combine 
together to facilitate wisdom.49 This is made explicit in Appendix A of the Didascalicon, 
where he discusses the order in which knowledge and understanding should be learned—
moving from logic to ethics to theoretical arts and only then to the mechanical arts. Thus, in 
learning mode, the mechanical arts are placed last, once all other knowledge has been 
assimilated, because 
…eloquence ought to be attained first; then, as Socrates says in the Ethics, the 
eye of the heart must be cleansed by the study of virtue, so that it may thereafter 
see clearly for the investigation of truth in the theoretical arts. Last of all, the 
mechanical arts follow, which, by themselves, are altogether ineffective unless 
supported by knowledge of the foregoing.50 
It is difficult to suggest, after such an explicit recognition that knowledge (scientia) of 
making in the mechanical arts (including architecture) is built upon understanding 
(intelligentiam) of the theoretical arts, that these layers of thinking would not be present in 
some form within the artefact. This fact is confirmed by the minuted argument between 
Italian and French experts on the development of Milan Cathedral in the early fifteenth 
century.51 Jean Mignot, the French representative, resolved a dispute with the incontestable 
truth that art is nothing without ‘knowledge’ (ars sine scientia nihil est).52 As a result, the 
evaluation of architecture, its setting and use should be subject to acceptance of a similar 
scope of scrutiny. However, this is not always the case since, at the most basic level, these 
layers of meaning have often been misinterpreted as a shift from the ‘real’ towards 
‘abstraction.’ The nomenclature that accompanies this interpretation usually includes ‘ideal’ 
as the purest form of abstraction. It is true that there is an implied ‘distancing’ from the 
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physical world in the type of hierarchical understanding proffered by Hugh, but the results of 
this enquiry do not advocate differing levels of embodiment. As Vesely states, 
[Even as late as the fifteenth century] space is still part of a phenomenal reality in 
which it cannot be treated in isolation from the conditions of its embodiment. 
After all, artificial perspective was never supposed to be a purely mathematical or 
absolute discipline but a pictorial one, representing not a concept of space or 
abstract structure but a concrete world in its visibility.53 
This is an important distinction to make, as it affects the way commentators from 
today, and from the past, often attempt to explain paradigmatic aspects of ontology through 
explicitly pragmatic phenomena. It was in the mediaeval world, saturated with meaning, that 
the re-emergence of classical culture gathered momentum in the arts and developed into what 
is now called the Renaissance. However, instead of it being a theoretical shift, or a break with 
the past, it is best seen as analogous to a natural progression guided by the theological and 
artistic trends that were already emerging from the twelfth-century renaissance evident in 
European theological schools.  
Thus, it appears that many of the themes explored and manifested in the art and 
architecture of the following centuries were more of a progression than a revolution. In 
architecture and art, ‘perspective’ and ‘form,’ although allowing for separate limited 
interpretations, continued to carry a depth of meaning more nuanced than many modern-day 
interpretations would allow. As a result, the continuing legacy of Latin classical culture is 
more likely to be present in some refined examples of contemporary architecture than it may 
be in buildings that display the liberal use of classical columns.54 
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